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STATE STANDARDS AT FEDERAL
HAZARDOUS WASTE SITES
United States v. Colorado
by Alyse Hakomi
he cleanup of contaminated hazard-
ous waste facilities is provided for by
two separate and distinct Acts of
Congress: the Resource Conservation and
Recovery Act (RCRA) and the Comprehen-
sive Environmental Response, Compensa-
tion, and Liability Act (CERCLA). Although
these Acts both provide for the protection of
human health and the environment, prob-
lems arise when it appears that both Acts
apply to the same contaminated facility. A
state's ability to enforce its delegated author-
ity under RCRA at a federal facility where a
CERCLA response is underway is currently
under scrutiny. Addressing this dispute of
whether state or federal law controls at such
a hazardous waste site, the court in United
States v. Colorado paved the way for states
to enforce their own hazardous waste stan-





II. FACTS AND HOLDING
The United States Army operates a haz-
ardous waste disposal pond designated as
Basin F which is located within the Rocky
Mountain Arsenal (Arsenal) near Commerce
City, Colorado.4 The Arsenal is a hazardous
waste treatment, storage, and disposal facil-
ity which is subject to regulation under
RCRA.s Built in 1942, the Arsenal is a site
where chemical warfare agents, chemical
products, and incendiary munitions are
manufactured and assembled., In the early
1980's the Army submitted parts A and B of
its RCRA permit application to the Environ-
mental Protection Agency (EPA) as part of
the closing procedure mandated by RCRA
for Basin F, which was listed as a "hazardous
waste surface impoundment."7 Noting defi-
ciencies in Part B of the application, the EPA
requested a revised plan from the Army.8
Instead of submitting a revision, the Army
undertook a remedial investigation and fea-
sibility study, which is the first step in a
CERCLA remedial action.
9
In 1984, following the enactment of the
Colorado Hazardous Waste Management
Act (CHWMA),' 0 the EPA authorized the
Colorado Department of Health (CDH) to
implement the CHWMA in place of RCRA
hazardous waste cleanup provisions." At
this time the Army submitted part B of its
RCRA/CHWMA application to the CDH
which, as did the EPA, found deficiencies in
the application.12 Two years later the CDH
issued its own closure plan for Basin F.13 In
response, the Army questioned CDH's juris-
dictional authority in requiring the Army to
implement CDH's plan.'
4
Colorado brought suit against the federal
government seeking an order that the Army
comply with its closure plan for Basin F.I1 In
response, the Army argued that Colorado's
cleanup plan, authorized by RCRA, was
precluded by CERCLA's hazardous waste
provisions.' 6 At that time, the Army had
undertaken a CERCIA interim response
action for Basin F whereby the Army made
an agreement with Shell Chemical Com-
pany to provide storage tanks for the hazard-
ous wastes located at Basin F." The Army
then requested that Colorado provide poten-
1990 F.2d 1565 (10th Cir. 1993), cert denied, 114 S.Ct. 922 (1994).
2 Pub.LNo. 94-580,90 Stat 2795, as amended by the Hazardous and Solid Waste Amendments of 1984 (HSWA), Pub.LNo. 98-616, 98 Stat. 3221 (codified as amended at
42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6992 (1988 and Supp. IV 1992)).
'Pub.1LNo. 96-510, 94Stat. 2767, as amended by theSuperfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act of 1986(SARA), Pub.LNo. 99-499, 100 Stat. 1613 (codified as amended
at 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (1988 and Supp. IV. 1992)).
4 990 F.2d at 1569.
5 Id
' Colorado v. United States Dep't of the Anmy, 707 F.Supp. 1562, 1563 (D. Colo. 1989).
7 Id at 1571. To obtain a RCRA permit, the Army had to submit general information about Basin F and its hazardous waste processing to the EPA in Part A of its application.
40 C.F.R. § 270.13 (1993). Under Part B, the Army provided detailed information about its plan to remedy the hazardous waste problems at Basin F. 40 C.F.R. § 270.14 (1993).8 990 F.2d at 1571.
9 Id.
t0 CoL.o REv. STAT. § 25-15-301 to § 25-15-316 (1989 and Supp. 1992).
" 990 F.2d at 1571. The EPA is authorized to allow states to create their own hazardous waste management plans as long as they meet minimum federal standards. 42 U.S.C.
§ 6926(b) (1992).
t2 990 F.2d at 1571.
13 1Id.
14 Id at 1571, 1572.
1 Id. at 1572.
' Id.; Colorado v. United States Dep't of the Armw, 707 F.Supp. 1562, 1565 (D. Colo. 1989).
17 Id.
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tially applicable or relevant and appropriate
requirements (ARAR's) for the interim re-
sponse action and that it comment on the
Army's plan, but Colorado did not comply
with the Army's requests.18 Further, the
Army contacted CDH and revealed that it
was withdrawing its RCRA/CHWMA per-
mit application because of the remedial
measures taken pursuant to CERCIA, but
that it would still comply with RCRA and
CHWMA in accordance with certain
CERCLA provisions.' 9
The federal district court originally held
that Colorado could enforce its CHWMA
provisions for the cleanup of Basin F even
though CERCLA response was already un-
derway, because Basin F was not listed on
the EPA's national list of priority hazardous
waste sites and further that Colorado's pro-
gram, as opposed to CERCLA, would most
likely ensure a proper and thorough cleanup
of Basin F.20 However, soon after the district
court's decision the EPA placed Basin F on
its national priority list and the Army moved
for reconsideration of the decision. 2 ' After-
wards, CDH issued a final amended compli-
ance order to the Army for its closure and
cleanup plans for Basin F.
The United States then brought the in-
stant action against Colorado in federal
district court challenging the enforcement of
CDH's final amended compliance order,
while Colorado counterclaimed for injunc-
tive relief.3 The district court granted sum-
mary judgment in favor of the United States,
holding that CDH could not enforce its
compliance order against the Army because
the EPA's listing of Basin F on the national
priority list took away the district court's
jurisdiction on the matter.24 In so holding,
the court relied on CERCLA's provision
limiting the jurisdiction of federal courts to
review challenges to CERCLA response
actions.2
Colorado appealed the district court's
decision, arguing that: (1) the CERCLA
provision relating to federal court jurisdiction
and review of CERCLA response challenges
did not prohibit Colorado from implement-
ing its "EPA-delegated RCRA authority;" (2)
Basin F's placement on the national priority
list was irrelevant to the issue; and (3) the
district court's holding that CERCLA pre-
cludes Colorado from enforcing its own
program was against well-established prin-
ciples. The United States argued that (1)
the CERCLA federal court jurisdiction stat-
ute prohibited Colorado from enforcing its
hazardous waste plan, and (2) CERCLA's
ARAR's provision, which allows state input
on remedial actions chosen by the President,
also prevents Colorado from implementing
its hazardous waste law independent of
CERCLA.Y The Tenth Circuit reversed,
holding that Colorado had the power to
enforce its EPA-delegated RCRA author-
ity." First, the court found that as Colorado
was attempting to enforce its own RCRA
requirements through the CHWMA as op-
posed to challenging a CERCLA response
action, CERCLA's provision relating to fed-
eral court jurisdiction did not bar Colorado
from attempting to enforce its own. compli-
ance order.2' Next, the court reasoned that
even if Colorado's action to enforce its
compliance order was considered a chal-
lenge to the CERCLA response already
underway and thus barred by CERCLA in
federal court, Colorado could still seek en-
forcement of its order in state court." Fur-
ther, the court held that the listing of Basin
F as a national priority site was irrelevant to
whether a state can enforce its own hazard-
ous waste cleanup laws at a federally-owned
site or whether such a facility is obligated to
comply with state hazardous waste laws.3 1
Finally, the Court responded to the United
States' claim that CERCLA barred Colorado
enforcement of its law independently of
CERCLA since under the Act the state's
involvement is limited to giving the President
input as to which remedy should be se-
lected.32 The court found that Congress did
not intend this provision to be an exclusive
means of state involvement (i.e. merely
giving the President input in choosing a
remedial action) in hazardous waste cleanup
and thus Colorado was not barred from
enforcing its own law.?3
III. LEGAL BACKGROUND
A. RCRA and CERCLA in General
Before analyzing the specific provisions
of RCRA and CERCLA which are integral to
the instant decision, it is helpful to have an
I" Id. Under § 9621 of CERCLA, remedial actions must at a minimum assure protection of human health and the environment. "Such remedial actions shall be relevant and
appropriate under the circumstances presented by the release or threatened release of such substance, pollutant, or contaminate." 42 U.S.C. § 9621(d)(1) (1988).
* 990 F.2d at 1572.
Id at 1573; Colorado v. United States Dep t of the Army, 707 F.Supp. 1562 (D. Colo. 1989).
21 990 F.2d at 1573.
22Id. Pursuant to the amended compliance order the Annywas required to submit an amended dosure plan, schedule forsoil contamination, monitoring and mitigation, groundwater
contamination, and other plans for each unit containing hazardous waste, and further required that the CDH approve all Army plans. Id.
3 Id. at 1573. 1574.
2 Id. at 1574.
Id. 42 U.S.C. § 9613(h) provides that mIno Federal court shall have jurisdiction under Federal law ... to review any challenges to removal or remedial action selected under
[CERCLAI."
" 990 F.2d at 1574.
27 Id.
2 Id. at 1584.
2 Id. at 1575.
Id. at 1579.
Id. at 1580.
3 Id. at 1581, 1582.
3 Id.
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overall view of the general purposes and
objectives of each statute. Congress estab-
lished RCRA in 1976 to create a system for
the treatment, storage, and disposal of haz-
ardous waste.?' The statute outlines its objec-
tive of promoting the "protection of health
and the environment and to conserve valu-
able material and energy resources...," and
further sets forth the national policy of the
United States: to reduce or eliminate the
presence of hazardous waste or to treat,
store, or dispose of it so as to minimize the
present and future threat to human health
and the environment.3s Under RCRA, waste
management is completed pursuant to strict
performance standards established by the
EPA.36 In turn, the EPA enforces such stan-
dards by establishing a permit requirement
for all owners and operators of hazardous
waste facilities, issuing compliance orders,
and imposing civil and criminal penalties for
violations.37 In addition, preexisting hazard-
ous waste facilities (i.e. those hazardous waste
facilities that were already in existence on
November 19, 1980 when the RCRA pennit
requirement became effective) could apply
for "interim status" pending permit approval
in order to continue the operation of such
treatment, storage, and disposal facilities.'
Congress amended RCRA in 1984 with
the Hazardous and Solid Waste Amend-
ments (HSWA), which expanded RCRA's
corrective action authority.39 Following
HSWA, RCRA corrective action applies to
on-site and off-site releases from solid waste
management units at facilities involved in
the treatment, storage, and disposal of
waste which are RCRA permit applicants,
regardless of when the waste was placed in
the unit." In addition, interim status facili-
ties and past or present management facili-
ties involved in releases which present im-
minent danger to health or the environment
are included under RCRA corrective action
requirements.4 1
However, RCRA was still limited in
scope.4 2 Since the statute only applied
prospectively, there was no adequate way
to deal with inactive hazardous waste sites.43
Therefore, in 1980 Congress enacted
CERCLA "to initiate and establish a com-
prehensive response and financing mecha-
nism to abate and control the vast problems
associated with abandoned and inactive
hazardous waste disposal sites."" As ex-
plained by one author, "[tlhe fundamental
difference between RCRA and CERCLA is
that CERCLA is designed to target and fund
the cleanup of areas that are already con-
taminated, whereas RCRA is better viewed
as a regulatory mechanism to avoid creat-
ing the same kinds of problems in the
future." 45
CERCLA provides that whenever there is
a release or the threat of a release of any
hazardous substance into the environment
the President is authorized to act in accor-
dance with the national contingency plan to
remove and provide remedial action, or take
any action which the President deems nec-
essary in order to protect the public health
and environment."6 In addition, the Presi-
dent is allowed to "establish procedures and
standards for responding to releases of haz-
ardous substances, pollutants, and contami-
nates" by making revisions to the national
contingency plan.47 These cleanup response
actions are funded through the Hazardous
Substance Superfund." CERCLA in turn
provides for the reimbursement of govern-
ment-incurred cleanup costs by parties found
to be strictly liable for the hazardous waste
contamination.49 Further, CERCLA requires
the prioritized listing of hazardous waste
sites.50 Finally, it should be noted that the
Superfund cannot be used to finance reme-
dial operations at a federal facility.5'
B. Specific Statutory Provisions Regarding
State Hazardous Waste Programs
This case note analyzes the conflict be-
tween RCRA and CERCLA regarding
whether a state is allowed to enforce its own
3 See generally42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6992 (1988 and Supp. IV 1992).
3 42 U.S.C. § 6902(a) and (b) (1988). See Old Bridge Chems., Inc. v. New Jersey Dep't of Envl. Protection, 965 F.2d 1287 (3rd Cir. 1992).
u 42 U.S.C. § 6924(a) (1988).
42 U.S.C. § 6925 (1988 and Supp. IV 1992); 42 U.S.C. § 6928 (1988).
* 42 U.S.C. § 6925(eX1) (1988 and Supp. IV 1992).
39 As outlined in J. Stanton Cuny, James J. Hamula, and Todd W. Rallison, The Tug-of-WarBetween RCRA and CERCLA at Contaminated Hazardous Waste Facilities, 23 Amz.
ST. LJ. 359, 365-366 (1991) 42 U.S.C. § 6924(u) (1988) requires those facilities seeking permits to undertake corrective action for any hazardous waste released from any
solid waste management unit regardless of when the waste was placed in the unit; 42 U.S.C. § 6924(v) (1988) requires RCRA permit applicants to undertake corrective action
for hazardous wastes that escape outside of the facility; 42 U.S.C. § 6928(h) (1988) requires facilities with interim status that release hazardous waste to take corrective actions
ordered by the EPA as it deems necessary; 42 U.S.C. § 6973(a) (1988) allows the EPA to bring action against any past or present facility whose actions contributed, or are presently
contributing, to any imminent threat to human health or the environment.
4 Id. at 366.
4 Id.
42 Id
43 United States v. Colorado, 990 F.2d at 1570 (citing H.R. REP. No. 1016(l), at 17-18, reprinted in U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6120). Although RCRA amendment 42 U.S.C. § 6928(h)
does apply to past hazardous waste management programs, the corrective action is limited to imminent dangers to health or the environment
"Id.
o Major William D. Turkula, Determining Geanup Standards for Hazardous Waste Sites, 135 Mn.. L REv. 167 (1992).
*42 U.S.C. § 9604(aX1) (1988).
4 42 U.S.C. § 9605(a) (1988 and Supp. IV 1992).
4 42 U.S.C. § 961 1(aXl) (1988 and Supp. IV 1992); 26 U.S.C. § 9507 (1988).
4 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a) (1988 and Supp. IV 1992).
- 42 U.S.C. § 9605(aX8)(A) (1988). This prioritized listing is compiled by the EPA. 40 C.F.R. § 300.425(bXI) (1993).
5142 U.S.C. § 9611(e)(3) (1988). Recognize that the instant case considers Basin F to be a federal facility.
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authorized hazardous waste treatment pro-
gram under RCRA at a federal facility even
though an EPA-initiated CERCLA response
is underway. What is now required is a
detailed review of RCRA and CERCLA




Under §6926, RCRA encourages the
EPA to work with states so that the EPA is
able to "promulgate guidelines to assist
states in the development of state hazardous
waste programs."52 If a state wants to
administer and enforce their own hazardous
waste program it must first submit an appli-
cation to the EPA for approval of the pro-
gram.53 If the state hazardous waste pro-
gram is authorized, "[sluch state is autho-
rized to carry out such program in lieu of the
Federal program under this subchapter in
such State and to issue and enforce permits
for the storage, treatment, or disposal of
hazardous waste."" States with such an
authorization are allowed to enforce their
programs in lieu of RCRA. If the state
thereafter takes any action under its own
hazardous waste program pursuant to its
EPA authorization, such action is deemed to
have the same force and effect as if the
action was taken by the EPA." In addition,
not only are states allowed to promulgate
their own hazardous waste programs with
EPA approval, they are allowed to enforce
standards which have more stringent re-
quirements for the treatment, storage, and
disposal of hazardous waste than the stan-
dards set forth in RCRA." If it is found that
a state with EPA delegated RCRA authoriza-
tion is not enforcing its program in accor-
dance with the requirements of the statute,
the EPA has the authority to withdraw its
authorization and establish a federal pro-
gram to deal with the contaminated site.57
States may receive federal assistance to
develop and implement their authorized
hazardous waste programs." For example,
this money may be used for such things as
planning for hazardous waste facilities, and
for the development and implementation of
state plans aimed at protecting human health
and the environment from inactive facilities
containing hazardous waste."
Federal facilities are subject to state and
local regulation under RCRA.W In particular,
any instrumentality of the federal govern-
ment, agency, or department that either has
jurisdiction over a solid waste site or is
involved in any activity which results or could
result in the disposal or management of solid
or hazardous waste "shall be subject to, and
comply with, all Federal, State, interstate,
and local requirements ... respecting control
and abatement of solid waste or hazardous
waste disposal and management."61 In
addition, the United States waives any type
of immunity it may have with respect to any
procedural or substantive requirements pro-
mulgated by the state.62 However, the Presi-
dent may exempt federal facilities from com-
plying with the above requirement if it is in
the paramount interest of the United States."
2. CERCLA
"Congress clearly expressed its intent that
CERCLA should work in conjunction with
other federal and state hazardous waste laws
in order to solve this country's hazardous
waste cleanup problem."6 CERCLA's "Re-
lationship to Other Law" provision indicates
that states are not precluded from imposing
additional requirements relating to the re-
lease of any hazardous waste within that
state." At federal facilities which are not
placed on the National Priority list, state
laws concerning the cleanup and remedial
action at the facility shall apply." Where the
state law applies more stringent standards at
the federal facility than those applicable to
facilities that are not owned or operated by
an instrumentality of the United States, then
state law shall not apply.67 However, courts
construe the national priority list require-
ment as merely for informational purposes
and therefore this requirement does not
affect whether state law will apply to a site
which is placed on the national priority list.68
Another important provision provides that
"[a] state may enforce any Federal or State
standard, requirement, criteria, or limitation
to which the remedial action is required to
conform under this chapter in the United
States district court for the district in which
the facility is located."' Whether this allows
' 42 U.S.C. § 6926(a) (1988 and Supp. IV 1992).
42 U.S.C. § 6926(b) (1988 and Supp. IV 1992). The EPA Administrator has 90 days to detennine and notify whether the state program is expected to be accepted, and an
additional 90 days to publish whether the state program is (1) equivalent to the Federal program, (2) consistent with Federal or State programs underway in other states, or (3)
provides sufficient means of compliance with the requirements of RCRA. Id.
!4 Id.
42 U.S.C. § 6926(d) (1988 and Supp. IV 1992).
42 U.S.C. § 6929 (1988).
42 U.S.C. § 6926(e) (1988 and Supp. IV 1992).
42 U.S.C. § 6931(a) (1988).
42 U.S.C. § 6931(c) (1988).
42 U.S.C. § 6961(a) (1988 and Supp. IV 1992); Parola v. Weinberger, 848 F.2d 956,960 (9th Cir. 1988).
42 U.S.C § 6961(a) (1988 and Supp. IV 1992).
'' Id.
3 Id. This exemption only applies to solid waste management facilities and does not mention hazardous waste treatment, storage, or disposal facilities. Id.
64 United States v. Colorado, 990 F.2d at 1575.
42 U.S.C. § 9614(a) (1988).
"42 U.S.C. § 9620(aX4) (1988).67 Id.
"See infra text accompanying notes 91-103.
42 U.S.C. § 9621(eX2) (1988).
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a state the freedom to enforce its own
hazardous waste program at a Superfund
site even when such program standards
differ from those enforced by the federal
government is the issue addressed in United
States v. Colorado."o This same provision
also provides that no federal, state, or local
permit is required when a remedial action
conducted on site is carried out under this
section.7 1 In addition, CERCLA allows the
President to promulgate regulations allow-
ing for state involvement in the initiation,
development, and selection of remedial ac-
tion that is to take place in that particular
state.72 This is more commonly known as
the ARAR's process, referring to state iden-
tification of "applicable or relevant and ap-
propriate remedies" for the cleanup of a
hazardous waste site.7 3
Finally, and arguably most important,
CERCLA's savings provision provides that
nothing in CERCLA "shall affect or modify
in any way the obligations or liabilities of any
person under other Federal or State law ...
with respect to releases or hazardous sub-
stances or other pollutants or contami-
nates." "Any person" under CERCLA is
defined to include individuals, states, and the
United States Govemment.75 This provision
seems to clear the way for states to imple-
ment and enforce their own hazardous waste
programs even when enforcement under
CERCLA applies as well, but the instant
conflict between RCRA and CERCLA is
evidence that this conclusion is under de-
bate.
B. Case Law
Several cases have addressed the issues
raised by the relationship between federal
and state law at hazardous waste facilities, as
well as the statutory interpretation that is
required to determine which cleanup stan-
dard shall apply. One case which concluded
that a state did not have cleanup authority at
a Superfund site was Colorado v. Idarado
Mining Company.76 In this case, the Tenth
Circuit held that the state was not authorized
to compel its own remedial enforcement
plan under CERCLA § 9621(e)(2), which
deals with cleanup standards applicable to
federal remedial actions and the state's right
to participation in such actions, because this
type of injunctive relief is not available to the
state as envisioned by CERCLA.77 This case
involved Colorado's enforcement of its own
plan for remedial activities at the Idarado
mine and milling facility for the cleanup of
metallic releases in several rivers and creeks
located in southwestem Colorado.78 Colo-
rado argued that CERCLA authorizes in-
junctive relief for states under § 9621(e)(2),
which enables them to enforce any require-
ment mandated by the remedial action.79 In
other words, under this section of CERCLA
the state is allowed to enforce any standards
under CERCLA or other federal or state law
(i.e. other "applicable or relevant and appro-
priate requirements" (ARAR's)).s0 How-
ever, looking to the intent behind § 9621,
the court held that the remedial measures
envisioned by this section are those selected
by the federal govemment or its delegates
such as the EPA, not by the states.8 ' The
court concluded that accepting Colorado's
argument would "defeat the intended scope
of state involvement as contained in §
121(f)."8
In Manor Care, Inc. v. Yaskin, the Third
Circuit dealt with a state's authority to enact
hazardous waste laws which are supplemen-
tal to federal laws regarding the cleanup of
hazardous waste." The facts of this case
involved an agreement between the EPA
and New Jersey regarding who would fund
the removal of hazardous wastes from two
New Jersey sites." Pursuant to this agree-
ment, the federal government would pay for
90% of the costs, while New Jersey would
fund the other 1 0%.8 However, under New
Jersey's Spill Act the state issued directives
to have the responsible parties reimburse it
for the 10% of the cleanup costs paid under
the CERCLA agreement.86 Manor Care and
the other responsible parties argued that the
Spill Act, including the directives issued that
7
0 Turkula, supra note 45.
742 U.S.C. §9621(eXl) (1988).
72 42 U.S.C. § 9621(fX1) (1988). These regulations must at least include (1) state involvement on the decision to perform preliminary assessments and site inspections, (2) allocate
responsibility to states for hazard ranking system scoring, (3) state involvement in the deletion of sites from the National Priority List, (4) state involvement in long-term planning
for remedial sites within that state, (5) opportunity for state review and comment on any remedial investigation and feasibility study, its remedial action, engineering design after
the remedial action is chosen, other information relating to the remedy, and the President's exercise of authority in selecting a remedial action, (6) notice to states of negotiation
and settlement with potentially responsible parties in a response action at a facility in that state, (7) notice and opportunity to comment on the President's proposal and alternate
plans for remedial action, and (8) notice and explanation to states of proposed actions at facilities within that state. Id.
73 United States v. Colorado, 990 F.2d at 1572.
' 42 U.S.C. § 9652(d) (1988).
n 42 U.S.C. § 9601(21) (1988 and Supp. IV 1992).
7 916 F.2d 1486 (10th Cir. 1990).
nId. at 1493, 1494.
78 Id. at 1488-1490.
" Id. at 1493.
a Id. at 1494.
a1 Id. at 1495.
1 Id. Section 9621(f) is the provision under CERCLA which provides for state involvement in choosing remedial actions which are "federal in character." Id.
a 950 F.2d 122 (3d Cir. 1991).
aId. at 123, 124.
a Id. at 124.
aICd The Spill Act provides that the State of New Jersey, acting through the New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection, can remove hazardous wastes by itself or require
any responsible party to do so. Id.; N.J. REv. STAT. § 58:10-23.11f(a). The Jersey Supreme Court held this to impliedly mean that the Department of Environmental Protection
had the authority to issue directives to these responsible parties for reimbursement of the cleanup costs. Id. (citing Matter of KimberPetroleurn Corp., 539 A.2d 1181 (1988)).
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provided for reimbursement, was preempted
by CERCLA." The court began its opinion
by stating that "[flederal law may preempt
state law by express provision or by provi-
sions that evidence a congressional intent to
occupy a field and leave no room for supple-
mentary state regulation."" However, the
court then looked to CERCLA § 9614(a)
which provides that states are not prevented
from imposing additional standards with
regards to contaminated hazardous waste
facilities." Noting that this particular
CERCLA section originally did not provide
for reimbursements to a state for costs
compensated under CERCLA, the court
reasoned that the repeal of the original
language revealed that there was no Con-
gressional intent leading to the conclusion
that CERCLA preempted the Spill Act in any
way, and that New Jersey was free to enact
such laws regarding the cleanup of hazard-
ous waste sites. 0 This particular case is
distinguishable from Colorado v. Idarado
since Manor Care allows states to recover
cleanup costs under their own state laws
whereas the Idarado case only dealt with
states' inability to obtain certain injunctive
relief."
The D.C. Circuit addressed the policy
questions surrounding whether RCRA or
CERCLA applies to the cleanup of a hazard-
ous waste site in Apache Powder Company
v. United States,92 although this decision did
not deal directly with the issue of state law
enforcement of environmental hazardous
waste plans and federal facilities.' The
Apache Powder Company was responsible
for the release of nitrates from its plant in
Arizona and appealed the EPA's decision to
place the Company on the National Priority
list." Apache claimed that this listing was in
violation of EPA's policy not to include sites
on its National Priority List if the situation
could be remedied under RCRA.95 "This
deferral is designed ... to avoid duplicative
actions, maximize the number of cleanups,
and help preserve the [Superfund]."" Apache
first argued that it was irrational for the
cleanup to be handled under CERCLA stan-
dards because the costs would then have to
be paid out from the Superfund.Y However,
the court disagreed, stating that this was not
a factor to be taken into consideration, and
furtherthat the cleanup under RCRA may be
slower, uncertain, and less thorough, thus
justifying the cleanup under CERCLA." In
addition, the court recognized that Apache's
placement on the National Priority list was
not determinative of whether the site would
be cleaned under CERCLA. 9 Apache's sec-
ond argument was based on the EPA's
apparent disregard for its deferral policy to
RCRA.'oo However, the court recognized
that this deferral policy does not apply when
it is questionable whether RCRA applies to
a particular site. 01 Since nitrates are not
considered hazardous wastes-or constitu-
ents, the court found that RCRA did not
apply.'0 Therefore, the court found that the
EPA was authorized to implement its polic,
under CERCLA instead of RCRA.'a
IV. THE INSTANT DECISION
In United States v. Colorado, the Tent*
Circuit held that Colorado's attempt to en-
force its own compliance order did noi
constitute a "challenge" to the CERCLP
response action underway at Basin F, anc
therefore Colorado's action could be re
viewed in federal court.'0 In reaching this
conclusion, the court looked to the expres
language of CERCIA and RCRA to deter
mine Congress' intent in dealing with suct
issues of federalism.os The court noted thal
"Congress clearly expressed its intent tha
CERCLA should work in conjunction witt
other federal and state hazardous waste law.
in order to solve this country's hazardouw
waste cleanup problem.' o0
The court first analyzed CERCLA's "say
ings provision," 07 which provides tha
CERCLA shall not modify any person'.
liability under other federal or state hazard
ous waste law, along with CERCLA's "rela
tionship to other laws" provision"' givinc
states the authority to impose additiona
requirements or liability for the release o
hazardous waste within the state."o' The
court stated that if Colorado is barred fron
87 Manor Care 950 F.2d at 124.
8 Id. at 125.
8 Id.
0 Id. at 126. Originally § 9614(c) (repealed 1986) stated that a responsible party was not required to compensate for any cost of response actions which could be compensater
for under CERCLA
9Id. at 127.
- 968 F.2d 66 (D.C. Cir. 1992).
93 Id.
91 Id. at 67.
w Id.
6Id. (citing 54 Fed. Reg. 41,008 (1989)).





'o' Id. RCRA will apply only to hazardous wastes or constituents. Id. (citing 42 U.S.C. §§ 6924(uXv) (1988)).
10 Apache Powder, 968 F.2d at 70.
10 Id. at 67.
'4 United States v. Colorado, 990 F.2d at 1575.
10 Id.
106 Id
' Id.; 42 U.S.C. § 9652(d) (1988).
10 Id.; 42 U.S.C. § 9614(a) (1988).
I09 990 F.2d at 1575-1576. 1A l
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enforcing the CHWMA under CERCLA's
provision prohibiting federal courts from
reviewing CERCLA challenges, the Army's
responsibility under CHWMA would be
modified in violation of § 9652(d).1 o Fur-
ther, the court explained that federal law
would preempt Colorado state law by im-
posing additional liabilities and responsibili-
ties for the release of hazardous materials
which is in violation of § 9614(a)."'
In addition, the court noted that since the
Arsenal is a federal facility it follows that it is
subject to regulation under RCRA." 2 As
Colorado has EPA-delegated RCRA author-
ity (manifested in CHWMA), it also follows
that unless the Army was granted an exemp-
tion from complying with RCRA or respec-
tive state laws, the Arsenal is under
CHWMA's jurisdiction."13 The court rea-
soned that since there was no evidence of
such an exemption, Colorado had the au-
thority to enforce its program at the Arse-
nal. 114
The court tumed next to CERCLA's pro-
vision barring federal courts from reviewing
challenges to CERCLA response actions.115
The court confronted this provision by rea-
soning that "an action by a state to enforce
its hazardous waste laws at a site undergoing
a CERCLA response action is not necessar-
ily a challenge to the CERCLA action."" 6
The court felt that Colorado's enforcement
of its compliance order was in accord with its
EPA-delegated RCRA authority and as such
was not a challenge to the CERCLA re-
sponse action." 7
After analyzing the relationship of §
9613(h) with § 9652(d) and § 9614(a) of
CERCLA, the court then looked to the
inconsistencies between § 9613(h) and
RCRA's citizen suit provision.""s Although
CERCLA citizen suits are barred if brought
before the completion of a CERCLA re-
sponse, RCRA citizen suits are allowed prior
to the completion of a CERCLA response in
order to enforce RCRA provisions at the site
where CERCLA action is underway."" These
citizen suits allow any person to commence
a civil suit to either enforce any provision
effective under RCRA or prevent immediate
and substantial danger to health or the
environment. 120 Because only imminent
hazard suits are barred where CERCLA
response is underway, and not enforcement
suits, the court reasoned that there is clear
congressional intent that a CERCLA re-
sponse action would not prohibit a RCRA
citizen enforcement suit or any similar state
action authorized by the EPA to enforce its
own hazardous waste laws in lieu of RCRA. 1
21
The court went on to add that even if
Colorado's action to enforce its final amended
compliance order constituted a "challenge"
to the CERCLA response action at the
Arsenal and thus is barred by § 9613(h),
Colorado still has the ability to enforce its
compliance order in state court. Thus, as
the court pointed out, "§ 9613(h) cannot bar
Colorado from taking 'any' action to enforce
the final compliance order."l23 In fact, the
court recognized that under Colorado law
any CHWMA enforcement action must be
brought in Colorado state district court. 24
Therefore, the court concluded that the
Army is subject to CHWMA enforcement
under Colorado state law in Colorado state
court.125
Next, the court addressed the significance
of the EPA placing Basin F on the national
prioritylist.126Section 9620(a)(4)ofCERCLA
provides that state law shall apply to removal
and remedial actions at federal facilities
when such facilities are not on the national
priority list. 127 The court determined that the
congressional intent behind § 9620 was not
to preclude states from enforcing their EPA-
delegated RCRA authority since Congress
could have specifically provided for such a
result if it had wanted to.128 In addition, the
court supported this conclusion by pointing
out that § 9620(i), providing that federal
facilities must comply with any requirement
of RCRA corrective actions, "indicates that
110 Id. at 1576.
" Id.
n1 Id.; 42 U.S.C. § 6961 (1988 and Supp. IV 1992).
us 990 F.2d at 1576.
n
4 1d. "[Ihe President has authority to exempt federal facilities from complying with RCRA or respective state laws if he determines it to be in the paramount interest of the United
States." Id. (citing 42 U.S.C. § 6961 (1988 and Supp. IV 1992)).
us 990 F.2d at 1576; 42 U.S.C. § 9613(h) (1988). "The most stark example of section 113's breadth was United States v. Colorado." Heart ofAm. N. W v. WestinghouseHanford
Co., 820 F.Supp. 1265, 1277 (E.D. Wash. 1993).
u
6 990 F.2d at 1576. Other cases addressing § 9613 areBoarhead Corp. v. Erickson, 923 F.2d 1011 (3d Cir. 1991) ( 9613 prohibited federal court jurisdiction in case invoMng
EPA's CERCLA response action) and Sdialk v. Rebl, 900 F.2d 1091 (7th Cir. 1990), cert. denied498 U.S. 981 (1990) (@ 9613 barred CERCLA citizen suit challenging consent
decree between EPA and responsible party.)
" 990 F.2d at 1576.
18 id. at 1577; 42 U.S.C. § 6972 (1988) (RCRA citizen suit provision).
" 990 F.2d at 1577.
'oId. at 1578; 42 U.S.C. § 6972 (1988).
'2' 990 F.2d at 1578.
m Id. at 1579.
m Id (citing CoLo. REv. STAT. §§ 25-15305(2)(b) and 25-15-309(1) (Supp. 1992)).
m Id. at 1579-1580.
m Id. (citing 42 U.S.C. § 9620(aX4) (1988)).
I2 990 F.2d at 1580.
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The RCRA/CERCLA Debate
Congress did not intend that RCRA, or state
laws authorized by the EPA to be enforced
in lieu of RCRA, to be [sic] equivalent to laws
concerning removal and remedial actions."'2
As the court noted, placement of a federal
facility on the EPA's national priority list is
merely for informational purposes and is not
determinative of a federal facility's obligation
to comply with a state's EPA delegated
RCRA authority or the state's ability to
enforce this authority.1so
The next issue addressed by the court was
how the CERCLA provision giving the Presi-
dent authority to select an appropriate rem-
edy with the state's input affects Colorado's
ability to enforce its state law independently
of CERCLA.' 3 ' The court held that this
provision was not the exclusive means
whereby a state may have involvement in
CERCLA hazardous waste cleanup already
in progress.'32 Rejecting the argument that
Colorado was imposing upon the President's
authority, the court found instead that Colo-
rado was enforcing its delegated authority
under RCRA, which CERCLA recognizes as
valid under sections 9614(a) and 9652(d).?
The court reasoned that if Colorado did not
have the authority to enforce its cleanup plan
through RCRA, its involvement would be
limited to giving input to the President who
would then decide on remedial measures for
the cleanup site. 4 However, as the court
pointed out, Colorado does have this inde-
pendent authority, and therefore CERCLA
sections 9614(a) and 9652(d) allow for Colo-
rado enforcement of the CHWMA even
though CERCLA response is underway.""
The court then proceeded to address the
United States' argument that CERCLA §
9621(eXl), which prohibits any requirement
of permits for removal and remedial actions
conducted in compliance with CERCLA,
renders Colorado's compliance order unen-
forceable.' 6 Since the compliance order
only required the Army to update its RCRA/
CHWMA permit application, as opposed to
requiring the Army to obtain a permit, the
court held that the compliance order did not
violate § 9621(e)(1).3
Finally, the court turned to the dispute
over CERCLA's "inconsistent response ac-
tion" provision, which states that where the
President or a potentially responsible party
under CERCLA has initiated a remedial
investigation and feasibility study at a par-
ticular site, a potentially responsible party
may not commence an action that has not
been authorized by the President.'" Stating
that it was "unclear" why the United States
deemed this argument relevant to this case,
the court held that the "inconsistent re-
sponse action" provision does not prevent
states from carrying out their own hazardous
waste programs under RCRA-delegated
authority at a site where a remedial investi-




The provisions of RCRA and CERCLA
need to be harmonized in order to clarify
federal and state roles at hazardous waste
sites. Although the main goal of these envi-
ronmental statutes is to achieve an efficient
and effective means of cleaning up the
affected site, this goal is subverted by contin-
ued litigation over which entity has authority
to implement and enforce a remedial plan.
The unresolved conflict between RCRA and
CERCLA can only result in the wasting of
timeand limited stateandfederalresources.'4
In particular, "[i]t offers no additional ben-
efits, delays contamination cleanup, con-
fuses cleanup negotiations, increases the
risk of court action, risks driving facilities into
insolvency, and squanders available govern-
mental and private resources." 141
In addition, states and the EPA continue
to be at odds with the way hazardous waste
cleanups are conducted. States complain
that the EPA's cleanup procedures are so
clouded with bureaucracy that effective and
innovative remediation have become diffi-
cult, and that any EPA-delegated authority to
the states allows little added relief since such
authority is at best merely a duplicate of the
EPA's role.142 On the other hand, the EPA
protests that state efforts at federal hazard-
ous waste sites impede the remediation
process because states are not capable of
effectively executing a cleanup plan, and
further that CERCLA is ill-served by allowing
states unfettered control over federal sites.14 3
Since it is evident that the disparate pro-
visions of RCRA and CERCLA will continue
to provide an impractical and confusing
situation for those involved in the cleanup of
contaminated hazardous waste sites, a work-
able solution is necessary in order to provide
for efficient and effective remedies for fed-
' Id. (citing 42 U.S.C. § 9620(i) (1988)).
'-" Id. (citing S.RP. No. 848. 96th Cong., 2nd Sess. 60 (1980)).
1' Id; 42 U.S.C. § 9621 (1988 and Supp. IV 1992).




13 Id. at 1582-:42 U.S.C. § 9621(eX) (1988).
1" 990 F.2d at 1582.
13 Id. (citing 42 U.S.C. § 9622(eX6) (1988 and Supp. IV. 1992)).
19 Id. at 1582-1583.4 0 Curry, supra note 39, at 408.
1'4 Id. The authors suggest that Congress should enact a new CERCLA section that would provide for a mandatory RCRA deferral policy under RCRA in order to provide certainty
to treatment, storage, and disposal facility owners and operators when dealing with contamination problems. Id. at 407-408.
142 Peter M. Manus, Federalism Under Siege At The Rocky Mountain Arsenal: Preemption and CERCLA After United States v. Colorado, 19 Cowm. J. ETrn.. L 327, *1-*2
(1994).
1 Id. at *2. MELPR
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eral facilities dealing with hazardous waste
contamination. However, how does one
decide whether federal law (CERCLA) or
state law (RCRA-delegated EPA authority) is
the appropriate source of law in such situa-
tions? On one hand, federal law preemption
will provide for uniform treatment and reme-
dial measures throughout the states at con-
tanilnated facilities. The fact that CERCLA
was intended to be a comprehensive statute
is apparent from the acronym itself. On the
other hand, since each state is aware of and
must deal with its own peculiar environmen-
tal problems, the use of state law will ensure
that contaminated sites will be treated in a
matter best suited within that particular state.
One way to solve the conflict is to more
clearlydefinetherolesof RCRAand CERCLA
in the treatment and cleanup of hazardous
waste sites. One commentator states that in
order to provide a degree of certainty to
facility operators: (1) CERCLA should apply
to all instances when facilities are not subject
to RCRA corrective action; (2) the EPA
should be able to address, under CERCLA,
facilities which are unwilling to conduct a
RCRA corrective action; and (3) the EPA
should address corrective actions that RCRA
is unable to address.144 Although only con-
sidering standards for Superfund sites, an-
other writer who is in favor of federal plenary
authority proposed that: (1) the EPA should
be responsible for selecting remedies at
Superfund sites, and if states wish to inter-
vene by imposing stricter requirements they
may do so if they are willing to pay the extra
cost; (2) states should not be able to impose
more stringent requirements without assum-
ing the extra financial burden; and (3) once
a site has been remediated according to EPA
standards, states could pursue further mea-
sures without additional expense to respon-
sible parties."' 5
B. Present Interpretation
The instant case indicates the current
need to reconcile the provisions of RCRA
and CERCLA. Although Basin F has been
identified as "one of the worst hazardous
waste pollution sites in the country," the
focus has been on the litigation surrounding
this hazardous waste site rather than the
cleanup itself.1"' However, how useful is the
court's interpretation of the preceding RCRA
and CERCLA provisions in light of the fact
that the holding in the present case is limited
to instances where a claim is brought by a
state to enforce its own hazardous waste
remedial plan at a federal facility? In addi-
tion, as a federal facility Basin F was not
subject to funding through CERCLA's
Superfund but rather was underthe direction
of RCRA. In light of these particularities, it is
difficult to state that United States v. Colo-
rado stands for the proposition that states
have gained power to govem cleanups at
CERCLA sites located within that state.
Rather than signaling a newfound control by
states that is independent of CERCLA, this
decision does no more than solve the prob-
lem raised specifically at Basin F and merely
indicates that judicial intervention was nec-
essary to pave the way for the resolution to
this hazardous waste problem in the face of
statutory ambiguity.147 Although this case is
an affirmation of a state's role in the cleanup
of a federal hazardous waste facility, it is very
limited in scope and therefore contributes
little towards finding a solution to the RCRA/
CERCLA conflict.
The court in United States v. Colorado
adhered toa strict and literal interpretation of
thevarious provisions ofCERCLAandRCRA
to come to the conclusion that Colorado had
the authority to implement and enforce its
own hazardous waste program at Basin F.
The court identified that the root of the
problem was limited to an inherent discrep-
ancy between CERCLA and RCRA. By
framing the issue as a RCRA/CERCLA
conflict, the court was able to come to a
conclusion after a careful and deliberate
reading of the statutes' wording and then
clarified where one statute prevails over the
other. However, some commentators go
beyond the mere RCRA/CERCLA conflict
and analyze the broader issue of federal
preemption granted by the Supremacy Clause
of the Constitution.'" One particular author
recently wrote that "RCRA delegation does
not reduce the entire debate over cleanup
control at a specific site to one involving only
the comparison of two federal laws, CERCLA
and RCRA ... [rather] it is appropriate to
consider the case in light of the federal
authority to preempt or otherwise displace
state activity."I 49 The fact that the court
restricted its opinion to the RCRA/CERCLA
conflict and did not include an analysis of the
federal preemption issue lends credence to
the position that the United States v. Colo-
rado decision cannot be construed as a
general affirmation regarding a state's ability
to enact and enforce its own law in the face
of existing federal law, and thatthe decision's
impact is limited to the facts before it.
VI. CONCLUSION
This case note highlights attempts by the
courts to reconcile the provisions of RCRA
and CERCLA so as to provide a workable
solution to an ongoing problem of how to
remedy and prevent contamination at haz-
ardous waste facilities. Congress' desire to
protect human health and the environment
with a broad plan for hazardous waste
facilities is evident given the advent of both
RCRA and CERCLA. However, states also
play a large role in this comprehensive plan
for hazardous waste management. In order
to give states a chance to implement their
programs within their own boundaries, while
simultaneously allowing the federal govem-
ment to provide for a uniform system of
environmental laws, conflicting provisions
of RCRA and CERCLA must be resolved so
as to provide the most efficient and effective
standards for the cleanup of contaminated
hazardous waste facilities.
'" Cuny, supra note 39, at 408.
1o Turkula, supra note 45, at 192-193. In addition, Turkula proposes that responsible parties should be immune from further liability once the EPA selects a remedy, and criticizes
numerical expressions of risk.
16 thrited States v. Colorado, 990 F.2d at 1569 (citing Daigle v. Shell Oil Co., 972 F.2d 1527, 1531 (10th Cir. 1992)).
"'4 See Manus, supra note 142, at *24.
lo Manus, supra note 142, at *16.
'
49 Id. This author analyzes express and implied federal preemption under the authority of the Supremacy Clause and its relation to environmental law.
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